
On the other hand, by throwing on second down, you could get two cracks at running the football while providing some semblance of doubt for the Patriots. That means they’re stuck passing on third down with virtually no chance of running the ball, because it would be too difficult to line up after a failed run. If they don’t get it, they have to call timeout, probably with about 22 seconds left. Let’s pretend for a moment that the Seahawks decide to run the ball on second down. As Wilson took that fateful second-down snap, there were 26 seconds left and Seattle had one timeout. If you’re thinking about the game coming down to those three plays, you can also piece together a case that second down is the best time to throw the ball. But I can understand why they would be overly sensitive about leaving too much time on the clock. I’m not arguing that Carroll and offensive coordinator Darrell Bevell should have been so time-conscious as to basically waste second down on a pass play. The Packers, furthermore, responded to another huge Seattle comeback by taking over with 1:19 left and driving for a game-tying field goal in the NFC Championship Game.

In that game, the Seahawks handed the ball to Lynch on first-and-goal from the 2-yard line, and he immediately scored.ĭespite the stunning comeback, Atlanta got the ball back with two timeouts, completed a pair of passes, and got a 49-yard field goal from Matt Bryant to win the game. That was during the 2012 playoffs, when the Seahawks came back from a 27-7 deficit in the fourth quarter to take a 28-27 lead with 34 seconds to go. You can understand why Carroll might be afraid of getting burned in what seemed like a hopeless situation for the opposition, because you only have to go back to Seattle’s last playoff loss to remember how quickly things can swing. Rob Carr/Getty Images Breaking Down “The Decision” Granted, Carroll suggested his team was “… playing for third and fourth down,” which seems a little bizarre given that the Super Bowl was on the line, but I’m willing to give his ability to formulate coherent words 30 minutes after that play happened the benefit of the doubt, given that I was watching the game at home and could barely form meaningful sentences at what I had seen. After the game, Pete Carroll suggested that the Seahawks didn’t want to leave the Patriots any time for a last-ditch drive after Seattle’s seemingly inevitable touchdown. I don’t think passing the ball was the right decision, but let me try to put together a case in which it might be a justifiable choice. You will probably never understand why the Seahawks just didn’t hand the ball to Marshawn Lynch in that situation and worry about trying anything else later.

I’ll even get to how Bill Belichick nearly screwed up the situation before being bailed out by his team’s fifth cornerback. I can point out why it might not have been quite as awful a decision as it seemed immediately afterward, when we judge such choices almost entirely based on their outcomes. I can show you why Russell Wilson threw the pass. I can explain some of the logic behind Seattle’s now infamous second-and-goal play call.
